

Regulation and the Liability Problem for Increasingly Autonomous Systems

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Overview

- Regulating Robots & AI
- Promote Safety & Innovation
 - Markets
 - Public Opinion
- Expectations & Predictability
- Managing Failures

The Liability Problem

- As increasingly autonomous systems act in the world, in increasingly complex and unpredictable ways, how do we manage the liability for the harms they may cause?
- Separation of:
 - Causal Agency
 - Legal Agency
 - Moral Agency



Liability & Accountability

- Compensation for Harms
- Punishment
 - Retributive Justice
 - Feedback Signal (Reform/Learning)
 - Deterrence (Impact on Future Decisions)
- Intention & Human-Centric
- Accountability & Transparency

Legal Approaches

- Agents & Diminished Agents
 - Children, Slaves, Animals
 - Agency Law
 - Employees
- Product Liability & Negligence (Corporations)
 - Joint & Several Liability
 - Strict Liability
 - Insurance or State/Society

Responsibility

- *Retroactive*
 - Someone to Blame & Punish
 - Target of Reform (Feedback)
 - Source of Retribution

- *Proactive*
 - Active Taking of Responsibility
 - Making Moral & Legal Judgements

Human Responsibility

- Meaningful Human Control
- Kill Switch
 - Recognizing Misaligned Values
- Policy Lever
 - Laws Act on Humans/Institutions
- Inappropriate Delegation
 - Lethal Decisions
 - Deprivation of Rights (Due Process)

Accountability Gap in AWS

- Who is responsible for the deaths?
 - Programmers
 - Commanders
 - Operators
 - The AWS
 - The State
 - Nobody? (de facto)
- Minimal Liability in War
- War Crimes Require Intent



Policing & Lethal Robots

- Higher Standards for Use of Force
 - “In order to prevent an immanent threat of death or grave bodily harm.”
- Threat ID Requires:
 - Physical Modeling Capability
 - Psychological Model of Intent
- Could Disrupt Threat w/o Lethal Force
- Most Cases are Self-Defense of Officer
- **Answer: No Autonomous Use of Force**



Future Work

- Regulatory Mechanisms
 - On Humans/Manufacturers
 - Law
 - Ethics Boards
 - Training Engineers
 - Ethics in Design Process (IEEE P7000 Standard)
 - Internal to Autonomous Systems
 - Technical Safety Mechanisms
 - AI/Machine Ethics
 - Learned vs. Imposed by Design

Papers

- Asaro, P. (2016). “[The Liability Problem for Autonomous Artificial Agents,](#)” [AAAI Symposium on Ethical and Moral Considerations in Non-Human Agents,](#) Stanford University, Stanford, CA, March 21-23, 2016.
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- Asaro, P. (2015) “[Roberto Cordeschi on Cybernetics and Autonomous Weapons: Reflections and Responses,](#)” [Paradigmi: Rivista di critica filosofica,](#) Anno XXXIII, no. 3, Settembre-Dicembre, 2015, pp. 83-107.
- Asaro, P. (2012). “[On Banning Autonomous Lethal Systems: Human Rights, Automation and the Dehumanizing of Lethal Decision-making,](#)” Special Issue on New Technologies and Warfare, [International Review of the Red Cross,](#) **94** (886), Summer 2012, pp. 687-709.
- Asaro, P. (2011). “

Thank You!

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